The Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2019 (“the new CAMA”) recently signed into law by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a welcome development to Nigerian businesses. It has addressed the bottlenecks in formation of business entities and improved Nigerian corporate governance. It has also given leverage to small companies to thrive and incorporated technological innovations to the processes of the Corporate Affairs Commission (“Companies’ Registry”) to facilitate the ease of doing business in Nigeria.
However, the legislature in extending the powers of the Companies’ Registry to effectively regulate the activities of Churches, Islamic Religious Organisations, Charity and Non-Government Organisation which are registered as Incorporated Trustees (“associations”) has introduced some new provisions in the new CAMA which are capable of usurping the fundamental rights of citizens to their freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion, freedom of peaceful assembly and association and constitutional rights of access to Courts.
It is upon this premise that the Plaintiff, a Nigerian Citizen and Legal Practitioner, commenced Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1076/ 2020; Emmanuel Ekpenyong Esq. v. National Assembly, Corporate Affairs Commission and Attorney General and Minister of Justice of the Federation at the Federal High Court, Abuja Division, challenging the constitutionality of some provisions of the new CAMA.
The Plaintiff contends that Section 839 of the new CAMA which gives power to the Companies’ Registry to remove trustees and appoint an interim manager to take over an association where it reasonably believes that there is misconduct, mismanagement, fraudulent practices, for protection of the property of the association and public interest; Section 842, Section 843, Section 844 of the new CAMA which gives the Companies’ Registry the powers to control the proceeds of a dormant account of an association and dissolve an association on account of its dormant account; Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 of the new CAMA which directs associations to keep and submit their statement of affairs and accounting records to the Companies’ Registry, infringes the Plaintiff’s freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion enshrined in Section 38 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (“the Constitution”).
The Plaintiff opines that Churches, Islamic religious organisations, Charity and Non-Governmental Organisations give hope to the Plaintiff and the Nigerian people. The activities of associations augment the efforts of government. They act as watchdogs for the people and put the government in check. It is unfortunate for the provisions of the new CAMA to put the activities of associations under the complete whims and caprices of the Companies’ Registry which is an agency of the Federal Government.
The law provides for every association to have a Constitution which regulates the affairs of the association and protect them against misconduct, mismanagement, fraudulent or other activities which are contrary to the objects of the association. Hence, the Companies’ Registry has no business whatsoever in suspending trustees and appointing interim managers for them. This is a sure recipe for disaster. The activities of associations are not against public interest to warrant such draconian provisions.
The funds of associations are not public funds. They are contributions, offerings and freewill donations of members to carrying out their objectives. There is no legal justification for the Companies’ Registry to be interested in the dormant account of associations. Associations are non-profit making organisations. They are not business ventures as such the Companies’ Registry cannot be ingrained in the affairs of associations by expecting them to submit statement of affairs or accounting records to the Registry.
The Plaintiff has a freedom to his thought, conscience and religion alone or in community with others. The Plaintiff has a right to propagate his religion, worship, teaching, practice and observance in public or private and does not even need to register same with the Companies’ Registry to propagate same. Therefore, giving powers to the Companies’ Registry who is an outsider and complete stranger to determine the affairs of a place where the Plaintiff professes his thoughts, conscience and religion is an aberration which is in contravention of Section 38 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff contends that Section 839, Section 843, Section 844, Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 of the new CAMA infringe his freedom to peaceful assembly and association. This is because the Companies’ Registry has a wide discretion to appoint interim managers to replace suspended trustees. The interim managers to be appointed by the Companies’ Registry may have nothing in common with the members of the association and the members will not have a right to challenge such appointment.
This will impair the rights of members of associations to actively participate in activities of their associations and determine its direction. The enormous and dictatorial powers given to the Companies’ Registry to intrude and interfere with the operations and management of associations is not legally justifiable. The use of phrases such as “is satisfied”, “reasonably believes”, “deem it necessary”, “public interests” in relation to the powers of the Companies’ Registry over associations are ambiguous phrases that can easily lead to an abuse of power by the Companies’ Registry and contravene the Plaintiff’s freedom to associate peacefully with other persons enshrined in Section 40 of the Constitution.
Again, the Plaintiff contends that the provisions of Section 851 of the new CAMA which gives powers to the Administrative Proceedings Committee to hear cases arising from the provisions of the new CAMA limits the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights of access to Courts. Section 6 (1) and 6 (b) of the Constitution confers judicial powers to the Courts. Section 36 (1) of the Constitution gives citizens the right to access an independent and impartial Court to determine their civil rights and obligations. Section 251 (1) (e) of the Constitution provides for the Federal High Court to hear any matter arising from the provisions of the new CAMA.
Hence, the provision of Section 851 of the new CAMA comes as a very huge surprise. The composition of the Administrative Proceedings Committee is made up mostly of employees of the Companies’ Registry who are involved or aware of the issue which caused the dispute in the first place. It is against the principle of natural justice for a person to be a judge in his own case. In most disputes arising from the provisions of the company law or regulations, the Companies’ Registry is usually a party to the dispute.
The Companies’ Registry cannot independently and impartially determine a dispute which it is also a party. If this is allowed the Companies’ Registry will be a party and judge in its own case. It is without doubt that Section 851 of the new CAMA is contrary to the Plaintiff’s rights of access to Courts enshrined in Section 6 (1) 6 (b), Section 36 and Section 251 (1) (e) of the Constitution.
In conclusion, the Plaintiff contends that his freedom of conscience, thoughts and religion, freedom of peaceful assembly and right to access to Court are so serious and the only way to ensure that the rights are protected in the circumstance, is for the provisions of Section 839, Section 843, Section 844, Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 and Section 851 of the new CAMA to be expunge from the new CAMA. The Plaintiff prays for an order of mandatory injunction of the Court directing the Defendants to expunge the offending provisions of the new CAMA.
Concurrent Delay
/1 Comment/in Projects /by News DeskA concurrent delay occurs when independent delays overlap, each affecting the schedule and completion date of a construction project. Depending on project scale and complexity, two or more concurrent delays can act at the same time. True concurrency means the delay events of the client and the contractor both start and finish at the same time. However, true concurrency is very unlikely to occur. Reality shows that delays need only to overlap for a given period of time to qualify as concurring delays.
The most relevant aspect of concurrent delays is that courts, boards of contract appeals, arbitration panels, and experts, are inconsistent in defining and assessing concurrent delays. That is a direct consequence of contracts failing to include terms for matters of concurrency or doing it in an ambiguous way. Concurrent delays represent unique situations in which establishing liability is not a straightforward process. Although the consequences overlap, the causes are usually traced at various dates back in time. This leads to the difficult task of establishing the presence or absence of correlation. The most common bias here is to assume that if one event came after another, it must have been influenced by it.
While normal delays generate well-known contractual consequences, supported by either the client or the contactor, concurring delays leave many ends that are open to interpretation. Owners use concurrent delays to avoid being billed for extended overhead, change orders and other claims. On the other side, contractors invoke concurrent delays to escape paying liquidated damages and to recover extra costs associated with delays. A common example occurs when the contractor is already behind schedule by its own fault and the client triggers a second delay-producing event. Concurrent delays also take place when a delay caused by one party overlaps with an abnormal neutral event (extreme weather, social or political disturbance) causing an excusable event.
Judging concurring delays is complicated and verdicts are often unpredictable. An investigation is launched to establish culpability, with the first focus on confirming that the delays are indeed independent of each other. That is usually done through an analysis that proves the impact on the critical path of one delay persists when all the other concurrent delays are neglected. Another condition for concurrency as defined in AACE International RP 29R-03 is that none of the delays are voluntary. In addition, the delayed work has to be substantial and not easily correctable to constitute a claim. One possible outcome when no dominant cause of delay is found is apportioning delay. The decision must be fair for all parts, as verdicts on concurrent delays are often judged based on legal precedent. How cases are solved today will influence future cases.
When supporting their claims, parties should provide evidence derived from records of documents and communication. Such evidence must focus on pinpointing the exact moment the event causing the delay occurred. A cause-effect relation has to be proven, most often through a critical path analysis. Parties have an advantage when they can provide proof of identifying and addressing the danger of the delay with written notices.
Contractors should invest time and resources into making sure the contract’s requirements are well-known by all their personnel having an administrative role in the project. This is crucial for notifying delays in a timely manner and in applying for time extension. Prompt notice on anything that can potentially impact project completion should become a priority as any delays can have weight in court, even if the other party is also responsible for much of the delay. A contractor invoking a concurrent delay should always back their claims against a solid construction schedule. Owners should also take a proactive stance by being careful that the contract terms are enforced from the very beginning. The danger here lies in a more relaxed and passive attitude being mistaken by the contractor as implied consent.
Invoking a concurrent delay can constitute a strong defence for both contractors and owners. However, for that to be achieved, parties need to familiarise themselves with accurate tools for schedule updates, analysis, and forecasts. Concurrency of delay will probably continue to remain one of the most complex matters regarding construction claims, a double-edged sword that introduces uncertainty and maximises the potential for conflict.
Acceleration Claims
/1 Comment/in Construction /by News DeskAn acceleration of a construction project defines the situation when work is performed at a faster pace than initially planned. In most cases, acceleration is needed to counteract accumulated delays and to meet the agreed completion date. Acceleration can also occur when the contractor has a direct interest in seeing a project completed ahead of schedule – either by receiving a performance bonus or by relocating resources to another project. The contractor can accelerate work on a project by requesting its workers to perform overtime, by adding a new shift, hiring additional labour, subcontracting, or changing the sequence of activities. Whatever method is chosen, it comes with extra costs that can or cannot be later recovered. Accelerating the project schedule is never free. In addition, when the acceleration is sudden, labour productivity decreases substantially because of fatigue (for current workers required to do overtime) or unfamiliarity to the project (new workers).
There are three types of acceleration that are different based on their causes: Voluntary Acceleration, Directed Acceleration, and Constructive Acceleration.
Voluntary Acceleration describes the situation when the contractor unilaterally takes the initiative of speeding up work on-site, without being previously asked by the owner to do so. This can result in costs that go beyond the original bid and which won’t be recovered unless the client is notified and agrees with the acceleration. Reasons for a client to accept a voluntary acceleration mostly relate to the ability to generate revenue faster by selling, letting, or starting production, which can counterweight the increase in construction costs.
Directed Acceleration is the simplest and most straightforward case of speeding up the construction schedule. The client requests the contractor to accelerate work and pays for the acceleration costs. Such a situation won’t lead to disputes if parties agree on the magnitude of additional costs.
Constructive Acceleration is a situation that is not explicitly voluntary nor directed. Constructive Accelerations typically occur when the contractor is able to invoke an excusable delay such as design changes, added scope, extreme weather, site conditions that differ from bidding specifications, or force majeure events. Owner-caused delays also qualify to justify a constructive acceleration, as well as any other factors beyond the contractor’s control that couldn’t be initially assessed as risks.
Each type of acceleration can lead to an acceleration claim. Voluntary Acceleration claims don’t entitle to extra payment unless agreed with the client. Directed Acceleration claims usually have a predictable outcome, as extra payment is granted to the contractor once an agreement is reached. Constructive Acceleration claims are the ones more prone to create a dispute. The client might argue the contractor wasn’t entitled to accelerate, and the contractor might argue that accelerating the project was the only choice. Acceleration claims must meet a set of preconditions to constitute a reasonable dispute and grant compensation to the contractor. First, the excusable delay must be clearly identified. Delays qualify as excusable only if they impact the critical path of the schedule. Second, the contractor must have made the request for time extension according to contract obligations and in a timely manner to accommodate a response. If the owner denied the request, thus implicitly requiring for project completion according to the initial schedule, it forces the contractor towards a constructive acceleration. The final condition states the contractor must attempt an acceleration to counteract the delays caused by the excusable event and prove such action incurred extra costs.
As always, solving acceleration claims in a mutually advantageous way requires for communication between parties to be prompt and explicit. The difficulty of proving delays and associated acceleration orders highlights once more the importance of proper document management.
To give an example, the contractor is mistaken if they speculate a time extension won’t be granted by the client and act according to that presumption. What might have constituted a valid constructive acceleration becomes a voluntary acceleration in the absence of written client consent. Another common issue regarding acceleration claims is when the granted time extension is insufficient. In that case, a contractor has to prove that the anticipated work requires additional time or additional cost compensation.
Lastly, acceleration is a topic that has to be addressed as early as possible in a complex project. It is always simpler and less disruptive to smoothly speed up works as they encounter the first signs of delays, instead of waiting for them to accumulate.
Latham advises NVIDIA on US$40 Billion acquisition of Arm
/1 Comment/in Acquisitions /by News DeskLatham & Watkins LLP represents NVIDIA in its acquisition of Arm Limited (Arm) from SoftBank in a cash and stock deal valued at up to US$40 billion. The combination brings together NVIDIA’s leading AI computing platform with Arm’s vast ecosystem to create the premier computing company for the age of artificial intelligence, accelerating innovation while expanding into large, high-growth markets. SoftBank will remain committed to Arm’s long-term success through its ownership stake in NVIDIA, expected to be under 10 percent.
The Latham deal team is led by M&A partners Josh Dubofsky and Charles Ruck in Silicon Valley and New York and Ed Barnett and Farah O’Brien in London, with associates Saad Khanani, Amro Suboh, Hector Sants, Stephanie Isaia, Oliver Cohen, Rachelle Polsky, Michael O’Halloran, Andria Varnavides, Angharad Simon, and Saavan Shah. San Francisco partner Joshua Holian, Brussels partner Sven Völcker, Washington, D.C. partner Les Carnegie, and London partners David Little and Charles Claypoole advised on regulatory matters with counsels Rita Motta, Jana Dammann, and Annie Froehlich, and associates Sophia Bertran, Natasha Pardawala, Giuditta Caldini, Alexandra Luchian, Niklas Brüggemann, and Rob Price.
Advice was also provided on tax matters by Washington, D.C. partner Nicholas DeNovio and London partner Sean Finn, with associates Pierce Pandolph, Aoife McCabe, and Jared Grimley; on intellectual property matters by London partner Deborah Kirk and Silicon Valley partner Anthony Klein, with associates Arielle Singh, Kirsty Watkins, Grace Erskine, and Elva Cullen; and on benefits and employment matters by London partner Catherine Drinnan, Paris partner Matthias Rubner, Munich partner Tobias Leder, and San Francisco partner Julie Crisp, with associates James Robinson, Adam Ray, Romain Nairi, and Agathe Flandre; on real estate matters by London partner Quentin Gwyer with associate Danni Davies; and on environmental matters by London partner Paul Davies with counsel Michael Green. Additional advice on the transaction was provided by counsels Rachel Alpert and Daniel Smith, and associates Jason Despain, Yasmina Vaziri, and Marcus Tomlison.
Singapore Convention enforcement
/1 Comment/in Disputes /by News DeskIn this 9/12 the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, known as the Singapore Mediation Convention, came into force. This is a remarkable day for the international scenario of dispute resolution.
Article 14 of the Convention provides that it would enter into force six months after three of its signatories had ratified it into their domestic law, what happened in the 12 March this year, when Qatar became the third state to ratify the Convention.
The goal of UNCITRAL Working Group dedicated to the draft of the Convention was to create an international regime for the enforcement of mediation settlements that would contribute to increase the use of mediation as a conflict resolution method in international trade. With the Singapore Convention the role of mediation is strengthened and the reached agreements enforcements will be simplified.
The Singapore Convention applies to commercial cross border mediation. An important issue to pay attention at is the fact that Singapore Convention is not based in reciprocity between member states, as its “sister” New York Convention.
And what does it mean? It means that a member state shall enforce mediated settlement agreements even if it comes from a non member state. For example, if an international mediation was located in Brazil (a non signatories) it might be enforced in Saudi Arabia (a member state).
On the other hand, under the Convention, the states may adopt a reservation provision, which allows them to declare that they will apply it only to the extent that the parties to the relevant settlement agreement have agreed that the Convention will apply.
Thus, international mediation players from all nationalities should from now bear in mind that Singapore Convention matters.
The New Company Law and the Constitutional Rights of Nigerians
/1 Comment/in Law /by News DeskThe Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2019 (“the new CAMA”) recently signed into law by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is a welcome development to Nigerian businesses. It has addressed the bottlenecks in formation of business entities and improved Nigerian corporate governance. It has also given leverage to small companies to thrive and incorporated technological innovations to the processes of the Corporate Affairs Commission (“Companies’ Registry”) to facilitate the ease of doing business in Nigeria.
However, the legislature in extending the powers of the Companies’ Registry to effectively regulate the activities of Churches, Islamic Religious Organisations, Charity and Non-Government Organisation which are registered as Incorporated Trustees (“associations”) has introduced some new provisions in the new CAMA which are capable of usurping the fundamental rights of citizens to their freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion, freedom of peaceful assembly and association and constitutional rights of access to Courts.
It is upon this premise that the Plaintiff, a Nigerian Citizen and Legal Practitioner, commenced Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1076/ 2020; Emmanuel Ekpenyong Esq. v. National Assembly, Corporate Affairs Commission and Attorney General and Minister of Justice of the Federation at the Federal High Court, Abuja Division, challenging the constitutionality of some provisions of the new CAMA.
The Plaintiff contends that Section 839 of the new CAMA which gives power to the Companies’ Registry to remove trustees and appoint an interim manager to take over an association where it reasonably believes that there is misconduct, mismanagement, fraudulent practices, for protection of the property of the association and public interest; Section 842, Section 843, Section 844 of the new CAMA which gives the Companies’ Registry the powers to control the proceeds of a dormant account of an association and dissolve an association on account of its dormant account; Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 of the new CAMA which directs associations to keep and submit their statement of affairs and accounting records to the Companies’ Registry, infringes the Plaintiff’s freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion enshrined in Section 38 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (“the Constitution”).
The Plaintiff opines that Churches, Islamic religious organisations, Charity and Non-Governmental Organisations give hope to the Plaintiff and the Nigerian people. The activities of associations augment the efforts of government. They act as watchdogs for the people and put the government in check. It is unfortunate for the provisions of the new CAMA to put the activities of associations under the complete whims and caprices of the Companies’ Registry which is an agency of the Federal Government.
The law provides for every association to have a Constitution which regulates the affairs of the association and protect them against misconduct, mismanagement, fraudulent or other activities which are contrary to the objects of the association. Hence, the Companies’ Registry has no business whatsoever in suspending trustees and appointing interim managers for them. This is a sure recipe for disaster. The activities of associations are not against public interest to warrant such draconian provisions.
The funds of associations are not public funds. They are contributions, offerings and freewill donations of members to carrying out their objectives. There is no legal justification for the Companies’ Registry to be interested in the dormant account of associations. Associations are non-profit making organisations. They are not business ventures as such the Companies’ Registry cannot be ingrained in the affairs of associations by expecting them to submit statement of affairs or accounting records to the Registry.
The Plaintiff has a freedom to his thought, conscience and religion alone or in community with others. The Plaintiff has a right to propagate his religion, worship, teaching, practice and observance in public or private and does not even need to register same with the Companies’ Registry to propagate same. Therefore, giving powers to the Companies’ Registry who is an outsider and complete stranger to determine the affairs of a place where the Plaintiff professes his thoughts, conscience and religion is an aberration which is in contravention of Section 38 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff contends that Section 839, Section 843, Section 844, Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 of the new CAMA infringe his freedom to peaceful assembly and association. This is because the Companies’ Registry has a wide discretion to appoint interim managers to replace suspended trustees. The interim managers to be appointed by the Companies’ Registry may have nothing in common with the members of the association and the members will not have a right to challenge such appointment.
This will impair the rights of members of associations to actively participate in activities of their associations and determine its direction. The enormous and dictatorial powers given to the Companies’ Registry to intrude and interfere with the operations and management of associations is not legally justifiable. The use of phrases such as “is satisfied”, “reasonably believes”, “deem it necessary”, “public interests” in relation to the powers of the Companies’ Registry over associations are ambiguous phrases that can easily lead to an abuse of power by the Companies’ Registry and contravene the Plaintiff’s freedom to associate peacefully with other persons enshrined in Section 40 of the Constitution.
Again, the Plaintiff contends that the provisions of Section 851 of the new CAMA which gives powers to the Administrative Proceedings Committee to hear cases arising from the provisions of the new CAMA limits the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights of access to Courts. Section 6 (1) and 6 (b) of the Constitution confers judicial powers to the Courts. Section 36 (1) of the Constitution gives citizens the right to access an independent and impartial Court to determine their civil rights and obligations. Section 251 (1) (e) of the Constitution provides for the Federal High Court to hear any matter arising from the provisions of the new CAMA.
Hence, the provision of Section 851 of the new CAMA comes as a very huge surprise. The composition of the Administrative Proceedings Committee is made up mostly of employees of the Companies’ Registry who are involved or aware of the issue which caused the dispute in the first place. It is against the principle of natural justice for a person to be a judge in his own case. In most disputes arising from the provisions of the company law or regulations, the Companies’ Registry is usually a party to the dispute.
The Companies’ Registry cannot independently and impartially determine a dispute which it is also a party. If this is allowed the Companies’ Registry will be a party and judge in its own case. It is without doubt that Section 851 of the new CAMA is contrary to the Plaintiff’s rights of access to Courts enshrined in Section 6 (1) 6 (b), Section 36 and Section 251 (1) (e) of the Constitution.
In conclusion, the Plaintiff contends that his freedom of conscience, thoughts and religion, freedom of peaceful assembly and right to access to Court are so serious and the only way to ensure that the rights are protected in the circumstance, is for the provisions of Section 839, Section 843, Section 844, Section 845, Section 846, Section 847 and Section 848 and Section 851 of the new CAMA to be expunge from the new CAMA. The Plaintiff prays for an order of mandatory injunction of the Court directing the Defendants to expunge the offending provisions of the new CAMA.
Byron Pacheco joins Kirkland’s Litigation Practice
/1 Comment/in Litigation /by News DeskKirkland & Ellis LLP is pleased to announce that Byron Pacheco has joined the Firm as a partner in the Litigation Practice Group. He is based in the New York office.
Mr. Pacheco has experience representing clients in complex disputes, both at the trial court level and on appeal, in a variety of substantive areas, including antitrust, breach of contract, class actions, fraud, labour and employment and securities. He also has experience handling government and internal investigations and has maintained a strong pro bono practice.
“We are happy to welcome a rising star like Byron to our litigation practice here in New York,” said Sandra Goldstein, a litigation partner and member of Kirkland’s Executive Committee. “He’ll be able to immediately add value to the wide range of complex litigation matters we are handling, from securities litigation to antitrust, class actions and commercial matters.”
Earlier in his career, Mr. Pacheco clerked for judges in the Southern District of New York and the Northern District of California. Prior to law school, he was a researcher at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Mr. Pacheco is a member of the Puerto Rican Bar Association, and was a New York City Bar Association Associate Leadership Institute Fellow and a Leadership Council on Legal Diversity Pathfinder. He was also recently appointed to the Board of Directors of the Stonewall Community Foundation.
“I’m excited to join Kirkland’s litigation practice and I’m really looking forward to working with such a dynamic and talented team of lawyers,” Mr. Pacheco said.
Mr. Pacheco is an alumnus of Stanford Law School and earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Hamilton College and Harvard University, respectively. He was previously an associate with Boies Schiller Flexner.